Stagnation on the surface, structural shifts underneath
2024 China–Japan goods trade totaled USD 270.50 billion, up 0.2% year on year. The Japan-side breakdown (Ministry of Finance trade statistics):
- Japan exports to China: USD 113.89 billion (+4.3%)
- Japan imports from China: USD 156.61 billion (-2.5%)
- Japan’s trade deficit with China: USD 42.71 billion (-16.9%) [1]
Flat at the top line, but the structural shifts underneath are sharp in three sectors. This post looks at semiconductors, autos, and agriculture/seafood, and maps out where the OEM opportunity lies.
Structural shift 1: semiconductors — bifurcation of regulation and dependence
The 2022 semiconductor export controls crystallized the split: China depends on Japan for materials, and Japan depends on China for processing.
- Materials China depends on Japan for: 67% of photoresist, 92% of fluorinated polyimide
- Tokyo Electron’s revenue share from China: 42% (FY2024)
- Mitsubishi Chemical’s lithium-battery separator price in China: 2.3× domestic alternatives
Meanwhile Japanese automotive semiconductors and SiC power devices are deeply embedded in the supply chains of China’s BYD and NIO [2].
Japan’s top three export categories to China in 2024:
- Machinery and electrical products: USD 46.98 billion (+6.4%, 41.3% of Japan→China exports)
- Chemicals: USD 11.55 billion (+1.8%)
- Transport equipment: USD 11.44 billion (+17.4%) [1]
The transport equipment line grew at +17.4%, faster than machinery and electrical (+6.4%, which includes semiconductor manufacturing equipment). The driver: hybrid vehicle (HEV) parts flowing into Chinese BEV makers.
METI’s 2024 Semiconductor Strategy maintains export controls on leading-edge nodes while preserving market access for mature nodes and equipment — a deliberate two-layer structure [3].
Structural shift 2: autos — the end of the ICE era and a new order
In 2024 China imported about 700,000 Japanese-built vehicles, 32.6% of all vehicle imports [2]. Volume, though, is down 40% from 1.1 million in 2020.
The interesting line is parts trade. Japan’s auto-parts exports to China grew +17.4% in 2024. Drivers:
- Japanese hybrid e-Axles and PCUs (power control units) are landing in China’s PHEV market
- Aisin Seiki’s 8-speed transmissions feed Chinese-OEM premium models
- Denso’s BMS (battery management system) is a Tier 1 at BYD and NIO
In other words, trade has shifted from finished vehicles to core components. Japanese vehicles are losing share in the Chinese market, while technology-intensive components dig deeper into Chinese BEV and PHEV makers [2].
On the Chinese side, CAAM’s 2024 annual report puts NEV (new energy vehicle) sales at 12.87 million units, 70% of the global market. Whether Japanese suppliers can hold Tier 1 / Tier 2 positions inside this NEV ecosystem is the question that will shape 2025–2030 auto-parts trade [4].
Structural shift 3: agriculture and seafood — the impact of Fukushima Daiichi treated water
After the August 2023 release of ALPS-treated water, China imposed a blanket ban on Japanese seafood imports. Japan-side data:
- September 2024 Japan→China seafood exports: JPY 58.68 million (-99.3% YoY)
- Full-year 2024 Japan→China food exports: -41.2% YoY, the steepest drop in 12 years [5]
Yet wood imports rose +17% in the same period. The asymmetry is real: seafood stopped, wood did not [2].
China-side data confirms it. 2024 China→Japan seafood exports: USD 3.45 billion (+3.4%); vegetables and mushrooms: USD 2.32 billion (+2.4%). China→Japan agricultural exports are holding up [6].
China Chamber of Commerce of Foodstuffs and Native Produce (CFNA), 2024 annual: China→Japan seafood and vegetable supply remains stable. Japan’s agricultural imports from China are falling, but “mutual dependence in China–Japan agricultural trade remains strong.”
What RCEP and CPTPP mean
RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), effective January 2022, includes the first bilateral FTA between China and Japan. It rolls out tariff cuts and simpler rules of origin. Auto parts, chemicals, and textiles are on track for additional tariff elimination between 2025 and 2030 [7].
China formally applied to join CPTPP in September 2021. In November 2024, MOFCOM spokesperson He Yadong published a simulation showing:
- China joining would lift member GDP by 0.2%–1.1%
- Member exports up 2.5%–11.8%
- World real GDP up 0.2%, world trade up 2.8% [8]
If China joins, industrial tariffs between China and Japan have further room to fall. Japan’s negotiating position is cautious, however; SOE reform, data flows, and labor rights are the three sticking points.
OEM opportunities, three years out
From the Dongguan plant’s vantage point, the most promising OEM lanes in China–Japan trade over 2025–2028:
| Sector | Growth (forecast) | Japan’s strength | China’s strength | OEM opportunity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hybrid auto parts | +15%/yr | Design, e-Axle | Cost, quick delivery | ◎ |
| Semiconductor materials (mature) | +8%/yr | Purity, yield | Processing cost | ○ |
| Plastic parts (medical) | +12%/yr | Standards, certification | Mass-production scale | ○ |
| Food packaging materials | +5%/yr | Hygienic design | High-volume production | △ |
| Used machinery and equipment | -3%/yr | Quality | Refurbishment cost | △ |
Hybrid auto parts and semiconductor materials in particular: Japan’s technical edge is not going away soon. Pairing it with China’s production scale is the most promising “China–Japan OEM 2.0” business model.
Near-term risks and responses
Given the three structural shifts, here is the 2–3 year risk map.
- Semiconductor bifurcation: Japanese leading-edge equipment exports remain a make-or-break issue for China. If controls tighten further, China accelerates substitution toward domestic equipment and materials. Response: mid-tier Japanese material makers should start transacting directly with Chinese Tier 2s to keep the relationship.
- Fukushima reputational drag: The seafood import ban is still not fully lifted as of 2026. Response: Lock in Chinese demand for non-seafood agricultural products (vegetables, meat).
- FX volatility: 2024 averaged JPY 150/USD, 2025 around JPY 145. Response: Price contracts in USD to make the FX risk visible; RMB-denominated settlement from China is also rising, so a dual-currency invoicing workflow is worth setting up.
Summary
2024 China–Japan trade (USD 270.50 billion, +0.2%) looks flat, but three sectors are mid-shift. The OEM-perspective opportunities are:
- Hybrid auto parts (Japanese design × Chinese production scale)
- Mature-node semiconductor materials (sustaining the dependence structure)
- Industrial goods in general, riding RCEP and CPTPP tariff cuts
The keyword for 2026–2028 is shifting from “export to the China market” to “embed inside the China NEV supply chain.”
References
- Ministry of Finance, Japan, 2024 Trade Statistics (Preliminary), January 2025
- General Administration of Customs of China, 2024 China–Japan Trade Data, February 2025
- Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan, Semiconductor Strategy (2024 Revised Edition), June 2024
- China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM), 2024 China Automotive Industry Annual Report, January 2025
- Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Japan, 2024 Seafood Export Statistics, October 2024
- China Chamber of Commerce of Foodstuffs and Native Produce (CFNA), 2024 China–Japan Agricultural Trade Overview, March 2025
- RCEP Joint Committee, RCEP Tariff Schedules, 2024 Revision, 2024
- MOFCOM Press Conference, Macroeconomic Impact Assessment of China Joining CPTPP, November 6, 2024
- JETRO, 2024 China–Japan Trade and Investment White Paper, December 2024
- Japan External Trade Organization, Survey of Japanese Firm Participation in China’s NEV Supply Chain, 2024